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n April 2006, Governor Bill Owens
signed House Bill 06-1137' that in-
cluded an extensive revision of Colo-
rado's statutory treatment of the Rule
Against Perpetuities ("RAP"). After
grappling with the transitional provi-
sions, Colorado attorneys in the longer
term likely will welcome this release
from the so-called "RAP Trap."
2
Although the application of the RAP
to trusts was the focus of the 2006 legis-
lation, it also clarified the 1991 repeal of
the RAP in "nondonative transfer[s]."3
On the other hand, even after the 2006
amendments, so-called "domestic"
4
transactions and donative, non-trust in-
terests created by will, deed, or other-
wise, remain subject to the ninety-year
wait-and-see regime of prior law, so the
RAP cannot be entirely forgotten. This
article primarily discusses the current
status of the RAP as applied to Colorado
trusts, but will touch on its application
in other contexts, as well.
The Rule Against
Perpetuities Prior to the
2006 Amendments
For almost a century the RAP in Colo-
rado was principally a creation of the
common law, subject to minimal statuto-
ry limitations. However, during the last
two decades, the Colorado legislature re-
peatedly acted to significantly restrict its
application.
The Common Law Rule
A longstanding Colorado statute pro-
vides:
the common law of England so far as
the same is applicable and of a gener-
al nature, and all acts and statutes of
the British parliament, made in aid or
to supply the defects of the common
law prior to the fourth year of James
the First... shall be the rule of deci-
sion, and shall be considered as of full
force until repealed by legislative au-
thority.5
The Colorado Supreme Court confirmed
1607 as the fourth year of James the
First.6 The Duke of Norfolk's Case intro-
duced the "modern" RAP in 1682.7 Con-
sequently, Colorado courts adopted the
RAP as a matter of general common law,
without the imperative of the English
laws statute.
8
Harvard law professor John Chipman
Gray's statement of the common law
RAP typically is found in modern judi-
cial opinions, including those in Colo-
rado: "No interest is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one
years after some life in being at the cre-
ation of the interest." The rule was ap-
plied in a handful of Colorado cases and,
until 1991, the statutory responses prin-
cipally were confined to those adopted in
1943, creating exceptions for cemetery
trusts,10 and in 1951, for employee ben-
efit trusts."
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The 2006 Colorado General Assembly passed legislation
adopting a 1,000-year limitation applicable to interests in
trust, practically eliminating the Rule Against Perpetuities
('RAP"). This article discusses the legislation's impact on
the RAP in trust and non-trust situations.
Trust and Estate Law
The 1991 Colorado Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities Act
In 1991, Colorado adopted the Colorado
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act
("CSRAP").11 The CSRAP was modeled af-
ter the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities ("USRAP"), 13 which adopted
a ninety-year "wait-and-see" period for in-
terests that violated the common law
RAP.
The CSRAP superseded the common
law RAP, 4 and it abolished application of
the RAP to most "nondonative trans-
fer[s]."15 A "nondonative transfer" is not
defined in the statute, but the official com-
ments to the USRAP offer that the trans-
actions are "commercial-type" and in-
clude:
options ... preemptive rights in the na-
ture of a right of first refusal,. . . leases
to commence in the future, at a time
certain or on the happening of a future
event, such as the completion of a build-
ing ... nonvested easements; top leases
and top deeds with respect to interests
in minerals.16
It seemed that the exemption for nondo-
native transfers rendered the RAP of no
consequence to commercial transactions, 7
unless the transaction occurred prior to
the May 31, 1991 effective date of the
statute.18 However, the contours of the
nondonative transfer exemption were un-
certain, 19 and an article by Denver Uni-
versity law professor Lucy Marsh raised
additional questions.20 Professor Marsh's
principal concern ultimately was ad-
dressed in the 2006 amendments dis-
cussed later in this article.
The nondonative transfer exemption
left the RAP, as modified in the ninety-
year wait-and-see fashion, principally ap-
plicable to donative contexts, such as wills
and trusts, plus nonvested property inter-
ests or powers of appointment arising out
of the following specified "domestic" situ-
ations:
1) a premarital or postmarital agree-
ment;
2) a separation or divorce settlement;
3) a spouse's election;
4) a similar arrangement arising out of
a prospective, existing, or previous
marital relationship between the
parties;
5) a contract to make or not to revoke a
will or trust;
6) a contract to exercise or not to exer-
cise a power of appointment;
7) a transfer in satisfaction of a duty of
support; or
8) a reciprocal transfer.
21
The official comments to the USRAP con-
cede that the domestic situations can be
nondonative in some cases, but they nev-
ertheless are not excluded from the rule:
"Some types of transactions-although in
some sense supported by consideration
and hence arguably nondonative-arise
out of a domestic situation, and should not
be excluded from the Statutory Rule."
22
The upshot is that a spouse's right of first
refusal or purchase option, for example,
granted in a marital agreement or sepa-
ration agreement, would not automatical-
ly be excluded from the CSRAP, but would
be subject to the ninety-year wait-and-see
limit if Colorado law otherwise would ap-
ply the RAP to such interests.23
The CSRAP generally was effective on-
ly for interests created after May 30, 1991.
However, it provided a reformation reme-
dy for prior interests that were found to
violate the RAP.
24
The 1991 Colorado Common
Interest Ownership Act
During the 1991 legislative session that
produced the CSRAP, real property legis-
lation was enacted (with a 1992 delayed
effective date) that included an incidental
provision excluding condominiumn, cooper-
ative, and homeowner association rules
and regulations from the application of
the RAP. The Colorado Common Interest
Ownership Act, effective July 1, 1992, ex-
pressly states that the RAP does not ap-
ply to "defeat any provision of the declara-
tion, bylaws, or rules and regulations." 5
The 1995 Pet Trust Legislation
In 1995, Colorado adopted, with several
significant modifications, the substance of
Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") § 2-90726
that validates honorary and pet trusts.
27
With respect to pet trusts, the legislation
overrides doctrine that typically found
such trusts to violate the RAP for lack of a
human measuring life.28
The 2001 Trust Amendments
The CSRAP was amended in 2001 by
the addition of language exempting a non-
vested property interest from being in-
valid if"[t]he interest is in a trust and all
or part of the income or principal of the
trust may be distributed, in the discretion
of the trustee, to a person who is living
when the trust is created."29 This lan-
guage was effective as of June 1, 2001, but
the legislation is silent regarding its im-
pact on existing trusts. 30 The language
placed Colorado in the camp of states per-
mitting perpetual trusts. Nevertheless,
the language was troublesome in several
respects. First, it suggested that a trust
providing only for mandatory distribu-
tions would not qualify.3 1 This did not aid
a settlor's dynastic plans that would pre-
fer a strict accumulations phase where no
immediate discretionary distributions are
permitted. 32 It also would disqualify a
more common structure of an income-only
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qualified terminable interest property
("QTIP") interest 33 for the benefit of a
spouse, with the remainder passing to a
generation-skipping trust for descendants.
Second, although a narrow reading of the
statute would defeat its apparent purpose,
it is not altogether evident that the ex-
emption continued to apply in perpetuity,
after the potential distributees living at
the time the trust was created pass away.
Third, it apparently left powers of appoint-
ment subject to the ninety-year limitation
period, short of a perpetual result.34
Before the enactment of the 2006 RAP
legislation, there consequently were at
least three classes of trust future interests
considered from a RAP perspective. The
nature of these classes is helpful in under-
standing the 2006 legislation. First, trusts
created prior to May 30, 1991 were subject
to the common law RAP. However, a non-
vested property interest or a power of ap-
pointment created after May 30, 1991 by
the exercise of a power of appointment
contained in such trusts would be subject
to the CSRAP.35 Second, trusts created af-
ter May 30, 1991 and before June 1, 2001
were subject to the niney-year rule 6 of the
CSRAP. Third, trusts created after May
31, 2001 would be subject to ninety-year
CSRAP rule as a default, or might be per-
petual if the discretionary distribution
rule was observed.
The 2006 Amendments
The 2006 amendments principally ad-
dress interests in trusts, but some provi-
sions further clarify the role of the RAP in
nondonative transactions, such as com-
mercial real estate. Although the applica-
tion of the RAP to trusts created after the
new statute's effective date is simplified,
the application of the RAP to existing




The 2006 legislation introduced in the
Colorado House of Representatives fo-
cused on the RAPs application to trusts.
The Senate revised the bill to add lan-
guage more emphatically stating that the
RAP, particularly as applied to nondona-
tive transactions, is dead. First, the legis-
lation removes the CSRAP domestic ex-
ception for "a reciprocal transfer"37 that
Professor Marsh earlier had questioned. 38
Second, language is added to the exclu-
sions section expressly stating that the
statutory RAP, as amended, does not ap-
ply to "invalidate" excluded transactions,
such as nondonative transfers.39 Third,
the effective date section is embellished to
note that the CSRAP not only "super-
sedes" the common law RAP, but also
"abolishes" it "for nonvested interests cre-
ated after May 31, 1991."40
The RAP consequently is no longer ap-
plicable to clearly nondonative transac-
tions, as long as Colorado law applies to
the transaction and the interest was cre-
ated after May 31, 1991. Other claims of
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ders41 and unreasonable restraints on
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the 2006 amendments restate the ninety-
year wait-and-see rules, even for interests
created after the June 30, 2006 effective
date of the amendments." The CSRAP al-
ready enumerated situations that were
excluded from the CSRAP and for which
the RAP was abolished.44 However, there
are some remaining areas of concern.
Non-trust interests arising out of domes-
tic situations are subject to the ninety-
year rule. Non-trust interests created in a
will, such as a testamentary power of ap-
pointment, executory devises of real es-
tate, or concerns about the so-called "sloth-
ful executor,"4 5 are subject to the ninety-
year rule. Interests created by a donative
deed or other instrument of transfer are
subject to the ninety-year rule.
Because the statute retains the USRAP
alternatives of required vesting or termi-
nation "no later than twenty-one years af-
ter the death of an individual who is then
alive; or ... within ninety years after its
creation" 46 the common law RAP remains
relevant to these interests. Unlike the in-
terests in trusts that are discussed next,
for these interests, the common "twenty-
one years" saving clause remains appro-
priate, because the statute repeats the
prior CSRAP prohibition on clauses that
seek to extend the duration of the interest
to a date that falls on the later of ninety




The 2006 amendments eliminate most
remnants of the common law RAP as ap-
plied to interests in trust.48 Unlike the
CSRAP, which still referred to the com-
mon law RAP as an alternate method of
validating a nonvested interest (even if
the focus was on the ninety-year alterna-
tive), the 2006 amendments ignore the
common law rules and prescribe only a
single limitation period of 1,000 years "in
gross." The 2006 amendments require
close analysis in applying them to the dif-
ferent varieties of future interests dictat-
ed by their date of creation.
Trust Interests Created after June
30, 2006. If the trust interest is created af-
ter June 30, 2006, a nonvested property
interest is invalid only if it fails to vest or
terminate within 1,000 years after its cre-
ation.49 Similarly, a general power of ap-
pointment not presently exercisable be-
cause of a condition precedent is invalid
unless the condition precedent is satisfied
or becomes impossible to satisfy within
1,000 years after its creation.50 A "non-
general"5 1 power of appointment or a gen-
eral testamentary power of appointment
is invalid unless the power is irrevocably
exercised or otherwise terminates within
1,000 years after its creation.52 The RAP
was left dangling by the 1,000-year thread
and not abolished completely, to avoid ad-
ditional complexities necessary to avoid
the so-called "Delaware Tax Trap" dis-
cussed briefly in the following para-
graph.'
A nonvested property interest or a pow-
er of appointment created by the exercise
of a power of appointment is created when
the power is irrevocably exercised.54 How-
ever, a power of appointment created by
the exercise of a nongeneral power of ap-
pointment is considered created when the
first power of appointment is created,55
and that effectively limits the total term
of all appointed interests to no more than
1,000 years, no matter how many succes-
sive nongeneral powers are created or ex-
ercised. This provision aims to avoid the
"Delaware Tax Trap," which is a creation
of Internal Revenue Code ("Code")
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§§ 2514(d) and 2041(a)(3). 56 Although the
details are beyond the scope of this article,
the Code will convert a nongeneral power
of appointment that otherwise enjoys be-
nign gift and estate tax treatment into a
potentially taxable general power of ap-
pointment if the exercise of the power of
appointment involves "creating another
power of appointment which under the
applicable local law can be validly exer-
cised so as to postpone the vesting of any
estate of interest in such property, or sus-
pend the absolute ownership or power of
alienation of such property, for a period
ascertainable without regard to the date of
the creation of the first power."5 7 Limiting
the total term to 1,000 years from the cre-
ation of the trust and its powers sidesteps
this trap.
Drafting Trusts after June 30, 2006
For trusts created after June 30, 2006,
there are no transitional rules or elec-
tions. However, Colorado lawyers who did
not already grapple with the full impact of
the 2001 perpetual trust amendments
will need to reconsider how their trusts
will operate in an almost perpetual con-
text, particularly with respect to issues of
choice of applicable law, early termination
clauses, and saving clauses.
Although the 1,000-year period is gen-
erous and the practical equivalent of a
perpetual trust, the RAP is not eliminat-
ed as a technical matter. If the trust is
structured to continue forever, it techni-
cally may bump up against the 1,000-year
limit. In that case, the statute will permit
a court to reform the trust "in the manner
that most closely approximates the trans-
feror's manifested plan of distribution."
58
Consequently, the standard saving clause
will need to be modified to serve as a con-
trolled disposition of the trust assets
when the trust term reaches 1,000 years.
Even if a client does not want a dynasty
trust in near perpetuity and the trust's
fundamental distribution scheme will ter-
minate it long before a millennium, it
probably will be the case that the stan-
dard saving clause tied to "21 years alter
the death of the last survivor of the group
composed of" will be supplanted in basic
wills and trusts by one tied to "1,000 years
after the date of the creation of this trust
[or the testator's date of death]."
59
That said, focusing on the 1,000-year
limit could prove to be inadequate in more
complex situations, if the trust becomes
subject to the laws of a state that follows
other approaches to this issue, such as the
common law RAP, USRAP, or permitting
entirely perpetual trusts. 60 Although it al-
ready was the case for many complex
trusts prior to the 2006 amendments, it
seems increasingly likely that saving
clauses will evolve to become more flexi-
ble-and complex-provisions that at-
tempt to provide for possible alternative
multi-jurisdictional approaches to the
RAP issue. In light of the difficulty of
drafting such an all-inclusive clause, prac-
titioners instead might see highly flexible
provisions that simply limit the duration
of the trust to "the longest period permit-
ted by the law applicable to the trust."
Beyond saving clauses, the 2006 amend-
ments do not increase the complexities of
trusts for lawyers who already were draft-
ing perpetual trusts under the 2001
amendments or the laws of other states.
Such provisions are beyond the scope of
this article, but they include greater at-
tention to termination of the trust on the
failure of descendants, termination for
lack of sufficient trust assets, choice of ap-
plicable law, and the use of trust protec-
tors.61 The underlying point of these con-
cerns is that it rarely is possible to draft
for all circumstances for 100 years from
now, let alone 1,000 years into the future.
Indeed, it has been estimated that an av-
erage married couple with 2.1 children
would have more than 100 descendants
150 years after the trust is created, pro-
ducing approximately 2,500 beneficiaries
250 years after the trust is created, 45,000
beneficiaries 350 years after the trust is
created, and 3.4 million beneficiaries 500
years after the trust is created.
62
Trusts Created After May 31, 2001
and Before July 1, 2006. Trusts created
after May 31, 2001 and before July 1,
2006 will be subject to the same rules as
trusts created after June 30,2006, unless
the beneficiary of an affected interest or
the holder of an affected power of appoint-
ment files an election to block the retroac-
tive application of the statute.63 Apart
from offering greater choices of result, this
elective procedure counters arguments
that the statute has a retrospective im-
pact prohibited by the Colorado constitu-
tion64 or otherwise might violate constitu-
tional prohibitions on impairments of con-
tracts, substantive and procedural due
process, and takings of private property.65
This election applies to all interests in
pre-July 1, 2006 trusts impacted by the
2006 legislation.
Colorado lawyers who represent such
affected parties can file the statutorily
prescribed notice of election with the
trustee on or before July 1, 2008.66 The
statute expressly releases fiduciaries from
responsibility for not making the elec-
tion.67 This exculpation might discourage
the trustee from notifying beneficiaries of
this election, possibly raising procedural
due process claims.
6
Assuming that an affected party prop-
erly files the election notice with the
trustee, the election apparently would be
effective with nothing more. The statute
provides no qualitative standard of re-
view. It could be expected that few of these
elections will be filed, because a post-May
31,2001 trust otherwise could be perpetu-
al under the old law, or subject to the nine-
ty-year wait-and-see period of the
CSRAP. It is hard to envision a current
beneficiary who would obtain a significant
advantage by making the election. If the
trust included a saving clause tied to lives
in being plus twenty-one years, the saving
clause would control the duration of the
trust and the 1,000-year limit would be
largely irrelevant. Only if the saving
clause already were expressed flexibly in
terms such as "the longest period permit-
ted by the law applicable to the trust"
would the 1,000-year limit possibly ex-
tend the trust and deny a beneficiary his
or her terminating distribution, assuming
the trust was not drafted as a perpetual
trust from the outset under CSRAP.69
There are a number of possible out-
comes of the 2006 amendments, but in
light of the long timelines, this discussion
has a highly impractical quality. Never-
theless, the statute does raise interesting
issues, such as the treatment of unborn
beneficiaries.
70
Trusts Created After May 30, 1991
and Before June 1, 2001: Trusts that
were created after May 30, 1991 and be-
fore June 1, 2001 generally are subject to
rules that restate those that were in place
when the CSRAP first was adopted-no-
tably the ninety-year wait-and-see peri-
od-so, at first blush little has changed for
these trusts.7 1 However, the amendments
extend the clarifying language discussed
earlier with respect to trusts created alter
June 30, 2006, addressing the timing of
the creation and the term of interests cre-
ated through the exercise of powers of ap-
pointment. As is the case with trusts cre-
ated after May 31,2001 and before July 1,
2006, the beneficiary of an affected inter-
est or the holder of an affected power of
appointment can elect on or before July 1,
2008 that these provisions not apply
7 2
Trusts Created Before May 31, 1991:
Trusts created before May 31, 1991 would
remain subject to the common law RAP,
except that the reformation remedy of
The Colorado Lawyer / November 2006/ Vol. 35, No. 11 / 79
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current law is retained for property inter-
ests created prior to May 31, 1991 that vi-
olate the common law RAP 3 However, as
discussed below, the exercise of a power of
appointment after June 30, 2006 usually
would invoke the new rules, including the
1,000-year limitation, even for a pre-May
31, 1991 trust (with an exception for
trusts irrevocable on September 25, 1985).
Accordingly, the right of the beneficiary of
an affected interest or the holder of an af-
fected power of appointment to elect out of
the provisions on or before July 1, 2008
would apply here, as well.
The application of the new rules to pre-
May 31, 1991 trusts is somewhat intri-
cate. The statute's effective date provides
that it applies to a nonvested property in-
terest or a power of appointment that is
created on or after May 31, 1991. 74 How-
ever, the statute provides that a nonvest-
ed property interest or power of appoint-
ment created by the exercise of a power of
appointment is created when the power is
exercised. 75 That rule will make the post-
June 30, 2006 exercise of a power of ap-
pointment created in a pre-May 31, 1991
instrument generally subject to the new
rules.
The part of the statute prescribing the
1,000-year limitation applies to interests
in trust or powers of appointment created
after May 31, 2001, which essentially
would encompass all interests in trust
and powers of appointment created
through the exercise of a power of ap-
pointment after June 30, 2006.76 This is
buttressed by the language of the statute
that addresses exercises of powers of ap-
pointment, where the rule is repeated
that a nonvested property interest or pow-
er of appointment created by the exercise
of a power of appointment is created when
the power is exercised.7 As discussed ear-
lier in connection with trust interests cre-
ated after June 30, 2006, the statute clari-
fies that a power of appointment created
through the exercise of a nongeneral pow-
er of appointment is considered created
when the first power of appointment was
created.78 Accordingly, that interest must
vest within 1,000 years from the creation
of the trust.
There is another tax-driven exception to
the power of appointment rules. A non-
vested property interest or power of ap-
pointment created by the exercise of a non-
general power of appointment over any
part of a trust that was irrevocable on Sep-
tember 25,1985 is not made subject to the
1,000-year limitation, defaulting instead to
the ninety-year limitation of the new stat-
Nondonative (commercial-type) Transfers
" Transfers prior to May 31, 1991 are subject to the common law RAP, but a statutory reforma-
tion remedy applies.
" The RAP does not apply to transfers after May 30, 1991.
Domestic Situation Transfers and
Donative, Non-Trust Transfers
" Transfers prior to May 31, 1991 are subject to the common law RAP, but a statutory reforma-
tion remedy applies.
" Transfers after May 30, 1991 are subject to a ninety-year wait-and-see limitation.
Transfers in Trust (including powers of appointment in trusts)
" Trusts created prior to May 31, 1991 are subject to the common law RAP, but a statutory ref-
ormation remedy applies.
" For trusts created prior to May 31, 1991 but after September 25, 1985, an exercise after June
30, 2006 of a power of appointment created under the trust is subject to a 1,000-year limita-
tion. The exercise of a power of appointment created in a trust that was irrevocable as of
September 25, 1985 is subject to a ninety-year wait-and-see limitation. Beneficiaries have an
opt-out election until July 1, 2008.
" Trusts created after May 30, 1991 but before June 1, 2001 are subject to a ninety-year wait-
and-see limitation. Beneficiaries have an opt-out election until July 1, 2008.
" Trusts created after May 31, 2001 but before July 1, 2006 are subject to a 1,000-year limita-
tion. Beneficiaries have an opt-out election until July 1, 2008.
" Trusts created after June 30, 2006 are subject to a 1,000-year limitation.
Honorary Trusts and Pet Trusts
" Honorary trusts are subject to a twenty-one-year limitation.
* Pet trusts are limited to the life of the pet(s), plus the lives of any offspring in gestation at
the time the pet(s) become present beneficiaries.
ute that resembles the CSRAP.7 9 This pro-
vision was included so that trusts (or por-
tions of trusts) created prior to the effective
date of the federal generation-skipping
transfer tax do not lose that exemption on
account of a constructive addition to the
trust stemming from the exercise of a non-
general power of appointment.8s
Conclusion
The 2006 amendments promise to al-
most eliminate the application of the RAP
to Colorado trusts as a practical matter, in
light of the new 1,000-year limit. The
amendments also confirm that the RAP
no longer will apply to most Colorado
commercial transactions. Nevertheless, in
light of complications such as effective
dates, exceptions for domestic transac-
tions and non-trust interests, and ques-
tions of whether Colorado law applies to a
given transaction, the RAP cannot yet be
forgotten.
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